IC-1462GPT-3.5-turbo is substantially more robust to the generation exploitation attack, with attack success rate of only 7% compared to over 95% for open-source models

Yangsibo Huang, Samyak Gupta, Mengzhou Xia, Kai Li, Danqi Chen

SourceCatastrophic Jailbreak of Open-source LLMs via Exploiting Generation

The same generation exploitation attack (varying temperature, top-p, presence penalty, and frequency penalty via the OpenAI API) is applied to GPT-3.5-turbo on the MaliciousInstruct benchmark. The attack success rate under default decoding is 0%, and even with all four hyperparameters varied simultaneously, the ASR reaches only 7%. The authors attribute this robustness to content filtering (9 out of 100 prompts time out, suggesting filtering) and more extensive red-teaming by the proprietary provider.

Evidence
correlational
Key metric
ASR on MaliciousInstruct: default 0%, temperature 3%, top-p 3%, presence penalty 2%, frequency penalty 4%, all 7%
Caveat
The authors note this is a preliminary experiment; 9 out of 100 prompts experience timeout errors suggesting content filtering may be blocking the attack rather than the model being inherently aligned. The API only exposes four hyperparameters, limiting the attack surface compared to open-source models.
Model
GPT-3.5 / ChatGPT-3.5 GPT-3.5-turbo
Datasets
MaliciousInstruct / i-maliciousinstructions [eval]
Related findings
IC-1461
Extraction
automatic-extraction